, c* ^% _* q) P$ L" V, ^# M0 k公司可以花钱向谘商公司谘询关于政治风险的意见，诸如英国的控制风险（Control Risks）智库、美国的欧亚集团（Eurasia Group）、《经济学人》的姊妹组织经济学人信息部（Economist Intelligence Unit）都提供政治风险的谘询服务。欧亚集团的总裁伊恩布雷默（Ian Bremmer）及在这个领域有名望的大师也在这个主题上写过一些煽动性的书籍。- g$ y/ M) y' c" Q. E l! S
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但是公司需要的不仅仅是花钱购买忠告，他们需要将更多的重点放在对当地的认识上：许多执着于全球化的公司，将来可能会后悔轻看了当地的经理人。他们也需要不被稳定的投资表象所迷惑。埃及快速倒塌的专制应该给那些在中国──而非印度──投下大赌注的公司一些深思。毕竟，印度虽然混乱，但却是民主的；中国看起来有序，但那只是表象。 ( [" \" j, P( G- Q% c( G# g3 B* N + g6 d7 I3 g3 q+ y; r# f8 }复杂的政治经济学$ }, ^2 X3 |0 F( X, T' f
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一些技巧已经证明特别的成功。其中一个即分散风险（diversifying）的营运。克莱斯勒就因此逃过秘鲁国有化的影响，因为它的当地工厂只制造组装汽车的一半零组件。另一个是培养深厚的本土渊源。在过去多年以来，壳牌石油已经训练并雇用许多管理奈吉利亚石油工业的人。第三是共同承担风险。越来越多的公司与其他非政府组织和政府机构的企业形成复杂的联盟。 6 q1 G/ \ \+ l) Q+ g, S) _& {* a/ }( x- S: O5 M3 M
然而，所有这些技巧都有其致命的弱点。当重要的工厂倒闭之际，全球化的营运可能会让风险扩散，而不是隔离；拥抱地方政权可能使你成为仇恨的对象，就像壳牌石油在奈吉利亚遇到的一样；与你无法完全掌控制的当地人结盟，可能会被控以贪污的罪名。最后，只能说：“政治经济学”要比它的后代弟子“现代经济学”更复杂了。8 [6 a3 W* {& w! g+ T. K
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Businesspeople need to think harder about political risk Feb 10th 20116 h# M: }% n8 T
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A MONTH ago Ahmed Ezz was one of the most powerful businesspeople in Egypt. He controlled about 40% of the country’s steel production, played a leading role in the ruling party and, most important of all, was a bosom buddy of Hosni Mubarak’s son and heir apparent, Gamal. 9 x# W2 d5 l' @ H/ X G3 V! ^1 ~- ^5 T4 K. Q& N1 m1 g! n
Today he is a has-been. Protesters have demonised him and torched his company headquarters. The old guard has dumped him as a liability. He is under investigation, his assets have been frozen and his right to travel has been restricted. Western companies that cultivated Mr Ezz wasted their time and money. ( I" [4 W* B- j0 U0 U9 K6 \% C* o/ A$ h4 b9 `4 K9 x; k
It was once regarded as axiomatic that globalisation would marginalise politics. Theodore Levitt, one of Harvard Business School’s leading thinkers, argued that “the Earth is round but, for most purposes, it’s sensible to treat it as flat”. Kenichi Ohmae, a Japanese business guru, published “The Borderless World” and “The End of the Nation State”. Giant companies such as IBM and Ford played down the importance of country managers in their efforts to create globally integrated behemoths. ! u, g% s8 b9 h+ V9 O! g& |( m7 U2 W2 {
The events in Egypt are a reminder of how foolish such “borderless” thinking can be. Dick Cheney once remarked, “The Good Lord didn’t see fit to put oil and gas only where there are democratically elected regimes friendly to the United States.” It might be added that the Good Lord did not see fit to put economic growth in equally desirable places. The corporate world is rightly excited by the pell-mell growth in emerging markets, but these are rife with political risks—weak legal systems, makeshift institutions, volatile cities and fragile regimes. % r$ \1 i, C, V P8 V8 u ; f" W0 _/ j# T. dA growing number of countries, most notably China but also Russia and the Gulf states, are using business as an instrument of state power. And some of the world’s biggest companies, including most of the largest oil firms, are state-run, driven by political as much as economic considerations." o W2 P' i9 b
# R/ b/ z- F% Y) F& HChina is the leading offender, using state companies to snap up a growing share of the world’s natural resources. It is also using its state-industrial complex to pursue political goals. Google was forced to re-route its servers when it refused to censor e-mails. Four Rio Tinto executives were imprisoned in dubious circumstances. China is not alone: BP’s new partnership with Rosneft, Russia’s state-controlled oil giant, to develop Russia’s Arctic region is complicated by murky political considerations. % z4 {3 O( u5 ]# Q 7 Z `, C2 _9 I* l2 iPolitical risks can also bite Western companies at home, where governments are increasingly vigilant about corruption. The Obama administration is enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act with an evangelical zeal—and employing techniques once reserved for fighting organised crime. The British government is introducing tough anti-bribery measures. Executives who adopt what they regard as “local” rules in Thailand or Indonesia can find themselves facing prison sentences back home.+ w$ O. P- h( r. o* u
# F' a- K, @! a% t# b* P; n/ g& \3 E8 FHow do companies cope? There are no simple rules. Countries that are cavalierly lumped together as emerging markets have very different political regimes. In Brazil you need to understand Congress’s multi-party alliances; in China the power dynamics of the Communist Party; in Saudi Arabia the internal relations of the ruling family. Local politics add yet more complexity. / f0 G! B4 v# }5 ^( ]" \: N( V2 ?8 _' V2 |; G$ c
The most important advice is to take politics seriously. Oil and mining companies have always done this. Royal Dutch Shell has run a profitable business in Nigeria for more than 50 years despite a dangerous and volatile environment. “New economy” companies have tended to be much more naive. The Egyptian crisis demonstrates that they cannot avoid being caught up in political battles which are now fought over the internet. A Google executive in the region, Wael Ghonim, also doubled as a leading political activist.+ A: l8 ~. X; |' ]9 k* {, q' l
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A bit of help( ^" P" x0 k' W# A! _7 t
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Companies can buy advice from political-risk consultancies such as Control Risks, a British outfit, or Eurasia Group, an American one, or various niche consultancies set up by political bigwigs, from Henry Kissinger on down, and ex-ambassadors. (Full disclosure: the Economist Intelligence Unit, a sister organisation of The Economist, also offers advice on political risk.) Ian Bremmer, the president of Eurasia Group and a rising guru in the area, has written some provocative books on the subject. & ]! D: P: \4 Y0 P X+ p* V& _ 5 l0 [2 n$ S! k2 l/ bBut companies need to go further than just buying advice. They need to put more emphasis on local knowledge: many globalisation-obsessed companies may come to regret the fashion for downgrading country managers. They also need to be less impressed by the appearance of stability. The rapid collapse of Egypt’s autocracy should be food for thought for companies that have bet big on China (with its appearance of order) rather than India (with its messy democracy)." o1 e( [( |+ r
& p/ ^6 u2 j" _$ QSome techniques have proved particularly successful. One is diversifying operations. Chrysler escaped a wave of nationalisation in Peru because its local factory manufactured only half the components needed to assemble a car. Another is putting down deep local roots. Over the years Shell has trained and employed many of the people who regulate Nigeria’s oil industry. A third is sharing risks. A growing number of companies form complex alliances with other firms, NGOs and government bodies.% D& `) ]1 ?9 r0 q# ?; G! B8 f9 z
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Yet all these techniques come with a sting in the tail. Creating global operations may spread risks rather than isolating them when a vital factory is closed. Cuddling up to the local regime may turn you into an object of hatred, as Shell has discovered in Nigeria. Weaving alliances with local people you cannot fully control may expose you to charges of corruption. It turns out that political economy is a much more complicated subject than its trendy modern offspring, economics. ) W) P" z! B3 u# r. @' L2 B, j6 H& |' h, i. \
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