【国际财经】超英赶美不是梦

英国专栏作家吉迪恩•拉赫曼
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收到了大量有关我上周专栏文章的读者来信。在那篇专栏文章中，我指出美国占据全球主导地位的时代行将结束。其中一些来信完全是言辞粗鄙的辱骂——从“阳物嫉妒”(penis envy)到讨厌美国，说我什么的都有。; p1 ~2 p& @# f3 w' d
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但其中也有更为讲理的论点。这就是，我过于轻信高盛(Goldman Sachs)的预测，即到2027年，中国的经济规模将超越美国。我收到的很多电子邮件都谈出了这一点。

“你应该回过头去读读上世纪80年代那些关于日本将超越美国的文章，在那之前还有巴西奇迹，以及50年代，一些人认为苏联将主宰世界，因为他们找到了办事的方法。”

线性盈利预测造就了上世纪90年代的互联网股票估值奇迹（你只须将同样的增长率推至未来10年），似乎政治科学家也犯下了同样的错误。一时间，中国社会中的结构性问题变得并不重要（当然，15年前的正统观点是，如果没有民主，就不可能实现可持续的长期经济增长，而这就是当时为什么中国未进行广泛的政治改革而经济不能增长的原因）。

中国经济增长的动力来自新增劳动力和资本投入。这是个一次性事件，尽管其持续时间非常长（前苏联持续了20多年），经济增长动力最终也会枯竭。美国经济增长奇迹能够持续如此之久的原因在于，美国是一个自由和富于创造力的社会。从长期角度看，美国能够不断提高生产率。" V% e$ r" d: H

中国将在未来2年至3年吸收剩下的多余劳动力。目前尚无证据表明，西方资本真的在中国获得了大幅超额回报，而中国正在大规模补贴其国内资金成本。可以说，中国内地银行比日本银行在上世纪80年代的情况还要糟糕。未来20年至30年，与中国的独生子女政策相比，欧洲的人口结构问题根本算不了什么。中国正面临严重的环境问题，已经不能食品自给。试想，按全球标准支付食品价格将给中国政治稳定造成何种影响……诸如此类的问题还有很多很多。  W2 C+ y) H2 `) e' j

未来30年，中国会变得更加强大吗？这一点是肯定的。中国将成为世界上最大的经济体吗？没人真正知道。
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我猜想，数年后，当中国经济出现急刹车时，金融报刊就会撰写发人深省的文章，解释所有人如何误读了中国的增长奇迹，以及限制中国未来20年发展的重大结构性增长障碍（当然，这也是错的）。rs238848.rs.hosteurope.de7 {" E7 _+ z5 F% [2 k3 c0 K
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那么，我自己如何看待这一点呢？rs238848.rs.hosteurope.de8 ?: [1 U) r8 D6 p1 i" }

首先——这些观点中多数都非常有力。显然，在中国的政治稳定、银行系统脆弱性和环境等方面，都存在严重问题。我今年早些时候去北京时发现，中国政府官员似乎真的担心，如果不能维持两位数的经济增长，将出现社会动荡。他们似乎也远不能确信，未来几十年中国一定能够保证经济增长和政治稳定。- X" q; u0 b% N0 d9 ?8 F: H9 T
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那么，为什么我仍然倾向于认为，中国经济规模确实会在20年内超越美国呢？
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首先、或许也是最无力的理由是，过去15年来，我一直听到关于中国即将崩溃的预测，而迄今为止，什么事情也没有发生。1992年至1997年间，我曾担任驻亚洲的外国记者和编辑，当时人们对天安门事件的记忆依然清晰。目前人们对中国表示出的担忧——民主、银行系统、国有企业、农村社会动荡和西方保护主义——在当时都存在，担忧程度甚至更强。然而，中国经济却一直在增长。当然，所有这些阴暗的预测最终可能将被证明是正确的，这就像我们所有人最终都难免一死。与此同时，中国的经济增长势头绝对令人敬畏。人在德国社区6 Z4 v9 ^7 G' |2 _

第二个、也是最重要的一点，这是一个数字游戏。中国最终会成为世界最大经济体的原因在于，中国的人口规模大约是美国的四倍。上世纪80年代末，关于日本将超越美国的预测一直令人难以信服。两国人口规模的差距意味着，要想超越美国，日本人的平均富裕程度必须达到美国人的两倍以上——这种情况永远不可能发生。1 ^, g9 v) f1 V! L# m) k0 z& L
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相比之下，如果你认为中国永远不可能超越美国，那么你就必须相信，中国的人均国内生产总值(GDP)无法达到美国的25%。迄今已有多个亚洲“经济小虎”达到并远远超过了这一水平——日本、台湾、韩国和新加坡（一个超小型经济体）——它们中的一些完成了从威权到民主的艰难转型，而并未中断经济增长。' X0 q  d6 t6 c
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如果中国的人均GDP达到葡萄牙——西欧最贫穷的国家——的水平，其整体GDP将超过美国和欧盟的总和。

因此，你不必否认有关中国政治、环境和社会动荡等问题的观点，就能相信中国经济规模最终将超越美国。你只须记住，工业化和快速经济增长的进程一旦启动，就会保持非常强有力的势头。它们能够经受社会严重动荡的考验——即使偶尔爆发战争——并继续推进。
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I got lots of correspondence about my column last week – in which I suggested that the era of American global dominance is coming to a close. Some of it was rank abuse – accusing me of everything from “penis envy” to loathing of the United States.
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But there was also a much more reasoned line of argument. This was essentially that I had been much too credulous about Goldman Sachs's projection that the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the US by 2027. I got lots of e-mails making this point. Here is one (the author prefers to remain anonymous):
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“You should go back and read the pieces in the 80's on Japan overtaking US, before that there was a Brazilian miracle, and the 50s the Soviets were going to take over the world because THEY have figured out how to get things done."

Linear earnings projections did wonders for the internet stock valuations in the 1990s (you just had to extrapolate the same growth rate 10 years into the future), and it seems like political scientists are guilty of the same sin. All of a sudden structural issues in the Chinese society do not matter, (of course 15 years ago the orthodox view was that sustainable long-term economic growth was impossible without democracy and this was why China simply could not grow without an extensive political reform).

Chinese growth has been driven by additions of labour and capital. This is a one time event, and while it is a very lengthy event (worked for 20+ years in the USSR) you do run out of growth eventually. The US growth story has persisted for so long because it is a free and creative society and over the long term it can keep increasing its productivity.

China will absorb the remaining surplus labour in the next 2-3 years. There is no evidence that western capital actually earns a significant excess return in China and China massively subsidizes its domestic cost of capital. Chinese banks are arguably in a worse shape than the Japanese banks were in the 80s. The Chinese one child policy will make European demographic problems pale in comparison over the next 20-30 years. The country is facing massive environmental issues, it is no longer self sufficient in terms of food. Just think what paying global food prices will do to political stability in China… the list goes on and on….
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Will China be a lot stronger and more powerful in 30 years - sure. Will China be the LARGEST economy in the world? No one really knows…

My bet is that when the Chinese economy comes to a screeching halt a couple of years from now the financial press will be writing thoughtful pieces explaining how everyone has gotten the growth story wrong and significant structural growth impediments that would limit Chinese growth for the next 20 years (of course that would be wrong too)”
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So what is my response to this?
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First – most of these points are powerful ones. Clearly there are big questions about Chinese political stability, about the fragility of the banking system, about the environment and so on. When I was in Beijing earlier this year, the Chinese authorities seemed to be genuinely fearful of social unrest, if they were unable to keep the economy growing at double-digit rates. Even they seemed far from confident that future growth and stability is guaranteed for generations to come6 Y, H- }/ _! j$ l

So why am I still inclined to think that the Chinese economy will indeed be larger than that of the US within 20 years?

The first and possibly weakest reason is that I've heard predictions of an imminent Chinese crack-up for the last 15 years and – so far – nothing has happened. I worked as a foreign correspondent and editor in Asia from 1992-97, when memories of Tiananmen were still fresh. All the fears about China that are being expressed today - about democracy, the banking system, the state-owned enterprises, unrest in the countryside, protectionism in the west – were being expressed then, but with even more force. However China has kept growing. Of course, its possible that all these predictions of doom will be vindicated eventually. We will all be dead eventually, as well. But in the meantime, China's economic momentum is absolutely formidable.

The second and most important point is that this is a number's game. The reason that China will eventually be the world's largest economy is that its population is roughly four times that of the United States. Predictions that Japan would over-take the US, popular in the late 1980s, were always implausible. The difference in population size would have meant that the average Japanese would have had to become more than twice as rich as the average American for Japan to surpass America – and that was never going to happen.

By contrast, if you want to argue that China will never overtake the US, you would have to believe that China cannot achieve a GDP-per-capita of just 25% of American levels. And yet there are several examples of Asian “tiger economies” that have already got to that level and well past it – Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore (the latter, admittedly a micro-state) - some of them managing tricky transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, without stopping growth.
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My colleague Martin Wolf points out that if China were to achieve the GDP-per-capita levels of Portugal – the poorest country in western Europe – its overall GDP will be larger than that of the US and the European Union combined.

So you don't have to dismiss all the arguments about Chinese politics, the environment, social unrest and so on – to believe that the Chinese economy will eventually over-take America. You merely have to note that industrialisation and rapid economic growth are very powerful processes once they get rolling. They can survive a great deal of social unrest – and even the occasional war – and keep powering on.rs238848.rs.hosteurope.de! ^7 e5 T3 I/ A* P
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[ 本帖最后由日月光于 2007-6-30 14:22 编辑 ]