[国际新闻] “中国强势外交兴起：骑虎难下”

Ampelmann

美国保守型智库企业研究所资深研究员、亚洲问题专家卜大年4月16日在美国《外交政策》网站发表题为“中国强势外交兴起：骑虎难下”（Riding a tiger: China's resurging foreign policy aggression）的文章称，中国军事实力的壮大、领导权力的软化以及民族主义情绪的高涨都是中共一手造成的，都是中共体制问题。而胡锦涛和温家宝二人就是中共体制内的弱势领导人。9 B; X- _  t( B4 d( `2 l3 w
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* ^2 p# ?0 X! y; }: B, ~0 U& ^人在德国 社区卜大年(Daniel Blumenthal)称，三年以来，中共外交逾趋强硬，开始放弃奉行十几年的亚洲睦邻友好外交，将中国南海至于同台湾和西藏同等的“国家核心利益”地位，本质上将南海规定为自己领土。为此，中共还同越南渔船在争议海域发生摩擦；在东北亚，中国还同韩国和日本发生外交龃龉。在“天安舰”事件上，中共一直避免批评朝鲜对韩国的挑衅行为；在钓鱼岛问题上，中共不但强势要求释放被扣押船员，而且还一度中断了对日稀土出口。另外，（相比2011年胡锦涛访美）奥巴马总统2009年访华只得到中共的吝啬待遇，在气候变化至人民币汇率问题上，奥巴马没有取得实质收获便返回了华盛顿。
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他认为，解释中共这种国际舞台上的“无礼行为”只有借助三种相互重叠的因素，即解放军军事能力的提升，中共领导体制的软弱以及中国内部恐惧外国人的民族主义情绪。其中，仇外民族主义就是中共造成的。不过，一些中国人持有的“美国相对下滑”观点不涵盖在内，因为这种想法只是暂时的。
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对于仇外情绪，卜大年称，许多中国观察家认为，民族主义情绪主要是来自网民和中国知识精英。但是，多数人所忽视的一点是，中国外交正面临骑虎难下的境地。自1989年的天安门事件以来，中共致力于广泛的“爱国主义教育”活动，着力强调中华文明的至高无上和美日等强权国家给中国带来的“国耻”。现在，大多70后、80后乃至90后都在谈论美日是如何联合将台湾、西藏和新疆从中国分离出去。而这些人一般都受过教育，且有可能是西方化的年轻人，他们也是美国将中国自由化的政策考量范畴。另外，年龄偏小的中国人甚至没有听说过“天安门事件”，且将美国视为遏制中国的力量，认为民主台湾的政治是混乱中的典型，并对藏人不感激北京经济政策效益而存有不满。# k% r; N* V9 x0 \8 h/ x0 B
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卜大年称，现在看来，胡锦涛和温家宝被证明都是弱势领导人，无法在经济改革中进行果断决策，也不能让所有中央政治局委员遵循前领导人邓小平主张的“韬光养晦”政策。但是，这并不只是领导人软弱的问题。中共领导体制本身也很弱。现在的一党执政是受共识驱动，也就是说，没有哪位政治局成员在权力或正统性方面能够超越政治局其他委员。
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+ K" f: G  c/ R) \Riding a tiger: China's resurging foreign policy aggressionrs238848.rs.hosteurope.de/ p! B3 O, C8 E5 ~; [' o

6 S- v' x9 D0 m# wrs238848.rs.hosteurope.deBy Daniel Blumenthal   Friday, April 15, 2011
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中美分别为全球增长最快经济体和最大的经济体，关系越来越复杂，但跳不出跌宕起伏的怪圈。 & v9 p6 n- o( R
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- p7 j- G, K: e  k1 O, F人在德国 社区Why has China's foreign policy been more aggressive over the past three years? Why have the Chinese undone a decade's worth of good neighborly diplomacy in Asia? The facts of the case are now well known. In Southeast Asia, China declared the South China Sea a "core interest" (a term previously reserved for Taiwan and Tibet), in essence defining the sea as Chinese territory. To punctuate the point, China harassed Vietnamese fisherman near disputed islands in the sea.
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In Northeast Asia, China could not bring itself to condemn its North Korean ally for Pyongyang's wanton murder of South Korean soldiers and civilians on two separate occasions last year. China also picked a fight with Japan. After Tokyo acquiesced in Beijing's demand to release a Chinese fishing captain that had been arrested for ramming Japanese vessels in disputed waters, China suspended diplomatic relations, demanded an apology, and halted the sale of rare earth minerals to Tokyo. And finally there was China's shabby treatment of U.S. President Obama during his November 2009 visit to China. If ever there was a president entering office with an outstretched hand to Beijing, it was Obama. His secretary of state went out of her way to downplay China's human rights abuses. Obama delayed both a meeting with the Dalai Lama -- a standard affair in U.S diplomacy -- and the sale of the second half of a package of badly needed arms that President Bush had promised to Taiwan. During Obama's maiden voyage to China, Beijing reneged on agreements to allow the president's speeches to air on television without censorship, and left the new president to return to Washington without accomplishing anything on his agenda, from climate change talks to Beijing's currency manipulation.
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' h! r& P$ N5 j; |4 J$ t) DThe explanation for China's international rudeness is a threefold recipe for mischief: greater military power combined with leadership weakness and a xenophobic nationalism that China's leadership created (I leave out the view held by some in China that America is in relative decline, because this is thinking is probably transient).
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5 y+ g7 c& P! \China now has a very capable military with which it can push around its neighbors. Its shows of maritime strength in the South China Sea are meant to cow weaker powers. Indeed, at the first sign of Vietnamese resistance to Chinese claims, the official Chinese press warned South East Asian nations not to become too close to the United States. And taking a page out of its strategy for intimidating Taiwan, the PLA moved a brigade of its lethal short range missiles into place to get Vietnam back into line. Given that China attacked Vietnam in 1979 out of irritation at Hanoi's pluck, when China waves a fist at Hanoi all parties pay attention.
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$ j) A: B8 H  S( sChina's new policy of showing off rather than concealing its newfound military prowess was on display when Secretary Gates visited China earlier this year. In the lead-up to his visit, the People's Liberation Army apparently demonstrated its anti-ship ballistic missile capability leading PACOM Commander Admiral Willard to assert that the missile had reached "initial operational capability." China's leaders apparently found Gates's visit an opportune moment to display their new J-20 fighter, an aircraft that apparently has stealth capabilities. In short, China has more power and is exercising it in pursuit of its national interests.
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* S% y2 X/ ]2 x, yrs238848.rs.hosteurope.deWeak Leadership
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# t4 J8 o8 I' N5 f5 v  N人在德国 社区Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have proven to be weak leaders, unable to make tough decisions on economic reform and unable to keep all politburo members in line with Deng Xiaoping's policy of "biding time and hiding capabilities" (i.e., allowing China to grow strong without provoking a countervailing coalition that fears China's power). But it is not just a problem of weak leaders. The leadership system is weak. There is no one left in China with the revolutionary legitimacy of Deng or the legitimacy he could hand off (as he did to Jiang Ziamen), and thus the one-party state is now consensus driven - no one member of the politburo seems to have more power or legitimacy than another. Decisions seem to vacillate from those driven by complete risk aversion (e.g. North Korea and economic reform) to those driven by the aggrieved nationalism displayed by "netizens" and intellectual elites (see, for example, the South China Sea and Japan rows described above). Because of the weak leadership system, the PLA, which tends to favor a more hawkish foreign policy, has as strong a voice in decision-making as party members concerned with economic reform.2 a+ \& P1 {5 ]  {
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Xenophobic Nationalism
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2 h& d: Y9 @6 ?" m6 q2 }/ qMany observers of China have identified the nationalism often expressed by internet users and Chinese intellectuals as a prime driver of Chinese foreign policy. What many miss is that China is riding a tiger of its own creation. Since the Tiananmen massacre of 1989, the Party has engaged in a massive "patriotic education" campaign stressing both China's civilizational supremacy as well as its humiliation at the hands of great powers such as Japan and the United States. Talk to Chinese citizens in their twenties and thirties and you are likely to hear about Japanese-American plans to keep China weak and split Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang from China, and about China's natural place atop an Asian hierarchy. These are the educated, supposedly Westernized Chinese, which American policy had counted on to liberalize the People's Republic. Many younger Chinese have never even heard of the Tiananmen massacre, view all American policy as an attempt to contain China (including the war in Afghanistan), believe Taiwanese democracy is an example of political chaos, and are angry that Tibetans (many of whom have been killed or imprisoned in an underreported three year long crackdown) do not appreciate that Beijing has spurred economic growth in Tibet.3 X( X( r) ^( q/ K, z& M

4 t/ P+ o- |! qIf many Chinese elites harbor these worldviews, one can only imagine what the "losers" in China's wrenching years of economic growth believe. And what about the tens of millions of surplus men that China has wrought with its One Child Policy and preference for sons? They will be at the bottom of the Chinese socio-economic strata, unable to marry, and ready for all manner of violence and mayhem. It is true that China has to contend more with public opinion than it once did- but it created the climate of aggrieved nationalism that now circumscribes or even drives its foreign policy. This is not to say that there are no liberals in China who want economic reforms or who want China to fully embrace liberty at home and the liberal international order. Indeed there are, but the former are keeping their heads down and making money and the latter cannot do much from their jail cells.
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The combination of more military power, weak leadership, and aggrieved nationalism are systemic problems. They are likely to be part of the Chinese foreign policy landscape for some time. China planted the seeds for each decades ago - by investing in coercive military capabilities, by delaying political reform, and by "educating" their people with über-nationalistic propaganda. Now the world is reaping what Deng Xiaoping sowed.